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INTRODUCTION
Arby's has a constitutional right to just compensation for the government's taking
of its real property. Despite its rights, Arby's has been continually denied severance
damages. Because Utah Dept. of Transp. v. Admiral Beverage Corp., 275 P.3d 208
(Utah 2011) {"Admiral Beverage") overturned the prior ruling in this case and determined
Ivers I was wrongly decided, the jury verdict in this case should be reversed and
remanded so that Arby's can seek its remedy under the appropriate standards as set forth
in Admiral Beverage.
RESPONSE TO UDOT'S STATEMENT OF FACTS
UDOT has not contested any of the fact statements Arby's set forth in support of
this appeal.
ARBY'S STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL FACTS
Arby's sets forth the following additional facts in support of its appeal.
1.

On or about March 13, 2003, UDOT filed its Motion in Limine. R. at 42-

67. UDOT's Motion in Limine sought to preclude Arby's from having any experts
testify on Arby's behalf at trial about severance damages. Id. at 44.
2.

On or about March 31, 2003, Arby's filed its Memorandum in Opposition

to UDOT's Motion in Limine and in Support of its Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment. R. at 71-124.
3.

On or about May 22, 2003, the district court entered its Order granting

UDOT's Motion in Limine and denying Arby's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
1
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R. at 150-161. The district court's Order precluded Arby's from seeking any severance
damages.
4.

So that Arby's could commence an appeal, the district court certified its

Order as final on November 10, 2003. R. at 196-97.
5.

After the Order was certified as final, Arby's filed its first Notice of Appeal

on December 1, 2003. R. at 212-13.
6.

On April 29, 2004, the Utah Court of Appeals issued a Memorandum

Decision holding the district court's Order was not final and appealable. R. at 220-27.
7.

On February 17, 2005, the parties filed their Stipulation for Judgment. R.

at 238-42. A copy of the Stipulation for Judgment is attached hereto for convenience as
Addendum A.
8.

Pursuant to the Stipulation for Judgment, which allowed UDOT to

condemn the property it needed from Arby's for the subject construction project, the sum
of $104,500.00 was paid, including UDOT's initial deposit of $48,250.00 and an
additional sum of $56,250.00. Id. at 239.
9.

Paragraph 8 of the Stipulation for Judgment states as follows:

Defendants, by entering into this stipulation, do not intend to waive, and
expressly reserve, the right to appeal issues raised in the May 22, 2004
ruling issued by Judge Allphin in connection with UDOT's Motion in
Limini [sic] and Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
10.

Pursuant to the Stipulation for Judgment, the Final Order of Condemnation

was entered on March 2, 2005. R. at 247-50.
11.

On March 8, 2005, Arby's filed a new Notice of Appeal. R. at 252-53.
2
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12.

The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's May 22, 2003

Order preventing Arby's from pursuing its claim for severance damages. The court of
appeal's opinion is set forth at Utah Dept. of Tramp, v. Ivers, 128 P.3d 74 (Utah Ct. App.
2005).
13.

Arby's petitioned the Utah Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. Arby's

Petition was granted.
14.

Upon granting certiorari, this Court limited the issues for review as follows:

Whether article I, section 22 of the Utah Constitution permits claims
compensation, and Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-10 permits presentation
evidence of damages, arising from an alleged easement for view
visibility, where the damages to the alleged easement are caused
construction beyond the boundaries of the landowner's property.

for
of
or
by

A copy of the Supreme Court's April 5, 2006 Order is attached hereto for convenience as
Addendum B.
SUMMARY OF ARBY'S REPLY
UDOT's Brief fails to oppose Arby's primary argument concerning the impact
Admiral Beverage has on this appeal.

In fact, UDOT concedes Admiral Beverage

impacts this appeal by stating that because Ivers I has been partially overruled, Arby's is
now entitled to appropriate damages, if any, for loss of visibility. While admitting the
impact of Ivers I's reversal, UDOT's position that the issue of visibility can be segregated
from the severance damages analysis remains contrary to the Admiral Beverage's
holding. In Admiral Beverage, this Court called Ivers I's approach of attempting to
segregate and apportion market value based upon artificial distinctions between
3
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protectable and non-protectable property rights inconsistent with the law and unworkable.
Admiral Beverage, Corp 275 P.3d at 208, 211 & 214 (Utah 2011).
In a further attempt to deny Arby's from recovering severance damages, UDOT
relies primarily upon an argument that Arby's has already been compensated for its
severance damages except for those damages attributed to loss of visibility.

This

argument conveniently ignores the history of this case and does not accurately reflect the
record, including the express language of the Stipulation for Judgment under which
Arby's reserved all of its rights as impacted by the district court's denial of severance
damages.
UDOT has failed to acknowledge Arby's claims that the jury instructions given in
this case were confusing and inconsistent because of their attempt to reflect the holding
of Ivers I.

Arby's has pointed out the problematic instructions and described their

inconsistencies and the confusion they caused. UDOT has not rebutted this analysis.
Finally, UDOT's appraiser, based upon the authority of Ivers /, testified there was
no value for loss of view. Arby's submits the expert relied upon inappropriate material to
render such an opinion, while at the same time acknowledging Arby's sustained at least a
partial loss of view. In any event, the expert's conclusion is invalid under Admiral
Beverage because he attempted to isolate and value the impact of one factor rather than
testify about the decrease in fair market value of the remnant property caused by the
taking.

4
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ARGUMENT
POINT 1
UDOT FAILS TO CONTEST ADMIRAL BEVERAGE'S
IMPACT ON THIS APPEAL
Arby's primary argument for reversal is that while this appeal was pending, this
Court decided Admiral Beverage. Through Admiral Beverage, this Court reversed the
prior ruling in this very case {Ivers I), which was the law upon which this matter was
tried before a jury in the district court during April 2010. Arby's contends the reversal of
Ivers I during the pendency of this case justifies a reversal of the verdict, which was
based upon jury instructions and testimony from expert witnesses reflecting the
wrongfully-decided Ivers I appeal.
Rather than providing any authority that the Admiral Beverage ruling should not
result in a reversal, UDOT acknowledges that "given the partial overruling of Ivers /, the
defendants are now also entitled to an award of appropriate damages, if any, suffered by
their loss of visibility." Appellee's Brief at p. 10. However, UDOT's suggestion that
Arby's is only entitled to a claim for loss of visibility harkens back to Ivers Fs mistaken
approach of segregating and apportioning market value based upon artificial distinctions
between protectable and non-protectable property rights, which has now been reversed.
This Court described the method of isolating and valuing factors separately as "too
restrictive" and "unworkable in practice/5 Admiral Beverage, 275 P.3d at 211 & 214.
According to this Court, Ivers I was "an aberration" contrary to a long line of precedent
concerning how severance damages are to be measured. Id. at 214.
5
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Arby's is entitled to seek an award of its severance damages under the ruling in
Admiral Beverage.
POINT 2
ARBY'S DID NOT WAIVE ANY CLAIM
FOR SEVERANCE DAMAGES
UDOT relies heavily upon its argument that the parties reached a settlement in
2005 that compensated Arby's for its severance damages, except for loss of visibility.
This argument ignores history and is not an accurate representation of the record in this
case. Therefore, UDOT's argument should be disregarded.
As has been well-documented in the prior appeals, Ivers I arose from the district
court's May 22, 2003 Order, granting UDOT's Motion in Limine to preclude Arby's
from putting on evidence of severance damages. R. at 150-161. The district court's
ruling was based upon the causation analysis set forth in State v. Harvey Real Estate, 57
P.3d 1088 (Utah 2002), which UDOT relied upon in its attempt to convince the district
court that Arby's should not be allowed to put on any evidence of severance damages.
Prior to the district court's ruling, Arby's had filed an answer asserting affirmative
defenses based upon its right to severance damages. R. at 23-26. Additionally, in
response to UDOT's Motion in Limine, Arby's filed a Motion for Partial Judgment
distinguishing the Harvey Real Estate case and reasserting its right to severance damages
generally by showing that the subject construction project, which required the
condemnation of a portion of Arby's property, impacted numerous elements relevant to
property value including access, traffic flows, view and visibility, zoning compliance, etc.
6
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R. at 68-87. Arby's Motion also reiterated that a nexus between the taking and the
construction project was established. R. at 71-87 and 136-143. However, the district
court disagreed.
With the district court's ruling that there was no causal nexus, Arby's was
precluded from pursuing its claim for severance damages. Therefore, Arby's sought to
have the ruling certified as final so that it could appeal. The district court certified the
ruling and Arby's filed its Notice of Appeal. However, the Utah Court of Appeals issued
a Memorandum Decision that the district court's Order was not final and appealable.
Following that ruling, the parties executed a Stipulation for Judgment, allowing UDOT to
condemn the portion of Arby's property it needed for the construction project. Based
upon the Stipulation for Judgment, the district court entered its Final Order of
Condemnation. R. at 247-251. This allowed Arby's to appeal a final order and seek to
have the district court's ruling precluding severance damages reversed. The Utah Court
of Appeals eventually heard Arby's appeal and, relying heavily upon Harvey Real Estate,
upheld the district court's Order granting UDOT's Motion in Limine.
UDOT's Opposition Brief in the present appeal fails to acknowledge that the
Stipulation for Judgment was entered into so that UDOT could acquire the property it
needed for its expansion and elevation of Highway 89 and so that Arby's could file its
appeal. Pursuant to the Stipulation for Judgment, the parties did not agree that amounts
UDOT paid to Arby's were compensation for severance damages except for loss of view
and visibility. "Just compensation" was paid with respect to the parcel sought to be
7
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acquired pursuant to the Complaint. See Addendum A hereto. The language of the
Stipulation for Judgment, which is ignored in the Brief of Appellee, expressly reserved
Arby's rights to seek severances damages following the district court's ruling, setting up
Arby's appeal:
Defendants, by entering into this stipulation, do not intend to waive, and
expressly reserve, the right to appeal issues raised in the May 22, 2004
ruling issued by Judge Allphin in connection with UDOT's Motion in
Limini [sic] and Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.
After the Utah Court of Appeals upheld the district court's ruling on the Motion in
Limine, Arby's petitioned this Court for writ of certiorari. The Court granted Arby's
Petition on a very limited basis. In this Court's Order of April 5, 2006, the issue was
limited as follows:
Whether article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution permits claims for
compensation, and Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-10 permits presentation of
evidence of damages arising from an alleged easement for view or
visibility, where damages to the alleged easement are caused by
construction beyond, the boundaries of the landowner's property.
Addendum B hereto.
Because of the narrow scope of this Court's April 5, 2006 Order, Ivers I turned
into a case about isolating and valuing loss of view and visibility rather than whether the
district court and the court of appeals had decided correctly regarding causation.1 As this

1

Admiral Beverage did not reverse the portion of Ivers I concerning causation.
Severance damages are appropriate "when land is condemned as part of a single project even if the view-impairing structure itself is built on property other than that which was
condemned - if the use of the condemned property is essential to completion of the
project as a whole." 275 P.3d at 213 (quoting Ivers I 154 P.3d 802, 807 (Utah 2007)).
8
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Court acknowledged in Admiral Beverage, hers I was wrongly decided and was
inconsistent with years of precedent concerning how fair market value of real property is
to be assessed. Admiral Beverage, 275 P.3d at 216.
UDOT now criticizes Arby's for never attempting to attack the Stipulation for
Judgment because of its alleged limitation upon Arby's rights. This criticism makes no
sense when it is understood the Stipulation for Judgment was entered long before the
appellate courts turned Arby's severance damages claim into a futile exercise of
segregating and attempting to value specific factors such as view and visibility.
Additionally, as described hereinabove, the language of the Stipulation for Judgment
expressly reserves all of Arby's rights to challenge the district court's Order foreclosing
Arby's severance damages claim under Harvey Real Estate.

In light of the express

language of the Stipulation for Judgement, UDOT cannot argue Arby's waived its rights.
Based upon the foregoing, UDOT cannot ignore the procedural history of this
case, rely upon selective portions of the Stipulation of Judgment taken out of context, and

2

UDOT inaccurately quotes footnote 2 in the Ivers I opinion. That footnote does not say
Arby's was compensated for all severance damages other than view and visibility. The
Utah Supreme Court's decision to limit its review in Ivers I io whether view and visibility
were compensable came long after the Stipulation for Judgment, which reserved
generally Arby's severance damages claim.
9
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argue Arby's should not be allowed to pursue severance damages under the law as set
forth in Admiral Beverage.
POINT 3
UDOT HAS NOT REBUTTED ARBY'S CLAIMS
CONCERNING JURY INSTRUCTIONS
Without analysis, UDOT claims Arby's has failed to show that taken as a whole,
the jury instructions did not fairly instruct the jury. This is not correct.
Arby's Opening Brief identifies seven substantive jury instructions having to do
with loss of view and valuation. Point 2 of Arby's Opening Brief describes how the jury
instructions were confusing and inconsistent. Moreover, in light of the Admiral Beverage
ruling, the instructions were wrong. UDOT has done nothing to refute Arby's analysis
other than to disagree with it and claim that under Jensen v. Intermountain Power
Agency, 977 P.2d 474 (Utah 1999), the jury instructions made sense if taken as a whole.
UDOT's Brief specifically addresses none of the jury instructions pointed out by Arby's.
The only instruction UDOT addresses specifically is Jury Instruction No. 48
having to do with the compensation it previously paid to Arby's. However, UDOT's
representation of that jury instruction is inaccurate. Jury Instruction No. 48 did not
inform the jury that Arby's had already been compensated for severance damages except
for loss of view. Rather, it informed the jury that the "parties have reached agreement on
For the sake of argument, even if part of the compensation UDOT paid to Arby's for the
taking was a partial payment of severance damages, any concern regarding double
recovery could be managed by the district court by crediting the damages award by the
amount UDOT allegedly paid for severance damage. It would be contrary to Admiral
Beverage to remand this case for a trial concerning loss of visibility.
10
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the fair market value of the property taken for the highway construction" and, consistent
with the law as set forth in Ivers I, that the purpose of trial was to establish whether
further damages should be awarded for the value of loss of view. R. at 814. Because of
Ivers I, Arby's was not permitted to seek severance damages under the traditional
analysis as reiterated in Admiral Beverage. Therefore, the jury instructions in this case
could only reference severance damages based upon loss of view and they were entirely
confusing in instructing the jury on how the valuation was to occur.4
POINT 4
UDOT'S EXPERT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN
PERMITTED TO OPINE ARBY'S SUFFERED NO
DAMAGES AS A RESULT OF LOSS OF VIEW
Trial in this matter essentially boiled down to the proverbial battle of the experts.
The trial was limited to the amount of damages resulting from loss of view. UDOT's
witness was Philip Cook, an appraiser. Mr. Cook testified at trial that Arby's suffered
absolutely no damage as a result of the loss of view from the property. See Philip Cook's
trial testimony at pp. 41 and 45 (excerpts of Mr. Cook's testimony are attached hereto as
Addendum C). Mr. Cook conceded there was at least a partial view impairment (id. at p.
46), but he would not even allow room for an award of nominal damages. Mr. Cook also
4

UDOT attacks Arby's for not objecting to the jury instructions at trial, and argues that
without objecting, Arby's cannot claim on appeal that they were improper. This
argument must be rejected. The jury instructions were based upon this Court's decision
in Ivers I and its mandate. Attempting to challenge the instructions and seeking to have
the district court give instructions based upon something other than Ivers I would have
been futile. See State v. Rothlisberger, 95 P. 3d 1193, 1202 (Utah Ct. App. 2004) (parties
are not required to make futile objections to preserve a future claim).
11
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testified his appraisal was governed by his understanding of this Court's ruling in Ivers I.
Id. at 207. He acknowledged the difficultly in attempting to isolate loss of view for
purposes of conducting an appraisal. Id. at 2ll. 5 Arby's suggests Mr. Cook's opinion
that Arby's sustained no damages only confirms the un-workability of the Ivers I analysis
for measuring severance damages.
Clearly, if Mr. Cook had been precluded from relying upon hearsay and mostly
anecdotal evidence, UDOT would have had no evidence to support its claim that Arby's
suffered no damage, despite its admitted loss of view. The basis for Mr. Cook's opinions
should have been rejected in advance of trial by the district court. Mr. Cook admittedly
took information from owners of irrelevant commercial properties that their customers
had never complained about a loss of view, then extrapolated from that information that
loss of view causes no damage to properties like the one at issue in this case. Such
hearsay evidence from non-experts should not have been permitted to supported Mr.
Cook's otherwise empty opinion that Arby's sustained not one cent of damages for loss
of view.

5

Arby's expert, Gary Free, also characterized the task of attempting to isolate loss of
view as "an impossible concept" and "not in the real world." See Gary Free's trial
testimony at pp. 34 and 59 (excerpts of Gary Free's trial testimony are attached hereto as
Addendum D).
12
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CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the Court should grant Arby's appeal.
DATED this

day of August, 2012.
WINDER & COUNSEL, P.C.

nald J. Winder
M o W.Holt
\\
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FEB ! 7 2005
SECOND
.DISTRICT COURT
STEPHEN C. WARD (#3384)
Assistant Attorney General
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (#4666)
Attorney General
Attorneys for Plaintiff
160 East 300 South, 5th Floor
PO Box 140857
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0857
Telephone: (801) 366-0353

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
DAVIS COUNTY STATE OF UTAH

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,
STIPULATION FOR JUDGMENT
Plaintiff,
vs.
Civil No. 020700665
JAMES IVERS; KATHERINE G. HAVAS,
P and F FOOD SERVICES (Tenant); and
ZIONS CREDIT CORPORATION,

Judge Michael Allphin

Defendants.
The parties in the matter above-entitled, the Plaintiff Utah Department of Transportation
("UDOT") through its attorney, Stephen C. Ward, Assistant Attorney General, and the
Defendants, James Ivers, Katherine G. Havas, P and F Food Services through their attorney
Donald J. Winder (Zions Credit Corporation did not file an answer, and its name will not appear
as a payee on the final settlement check), and with respect to the issues in this case now pending
before the Court, agree and stipulate as follows:
Stipulation for Judgment
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1.

UDOT has heretofore filed its Complaint to acquire, by eminent domain, the

property and property interest of these Defendants located in Davis County, State of Utah, said
property being more particularly described in said Complaint here on file as Parcel Nos. 269: A
and 269 :E.
2.

UDOT has the right to condemn and acquire the property and property interest of

these Defendants in said parcel for a public use.
3.

The use to which the condemned premises herein is to be placed by UDOT is

public in nature and the court previously entered an order of immediate occupancy.
4.

Just compensation is due from UDOT to these Defendants for the acquisition of

their interest in the property condemned by UDOT herein and for such damages to other property
as may be recoverable under law by virtue of the acquisition as defined in the Complaint.
5.

Just compensation for the interest of these Defendants in the condemned premises

is the sum of $104,500, and of that sum, UDOT has previously paid these Defendants the amount
of$48,250.
6.

The Court may enter its Judgment in favor of these Defendants and against the

Plaintiff for the sum of $104,500 less the deposit of $48,250 heretofore paid to these Defendants,
for an unpaid balance of $56,250, which is the total amount remaining.
7.

Upon payment to these Defendants of the foregoing amount, it is further stipulated

and agreed that UDOT will be entitled to a Satisfaction of Judgment and that the Court shall
enter a Judgment and Final Order of Condemnation vesting in UDOT the fee simple interest of
Defendants in and to the property more particularly described in the Complaint here on file as
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
2 may contain errors.
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Parcel No. 269:A and easement interests upon Defendants' remaining property identified as
Parcel No. 269:E.
8.

Defendants, by entering into this stipulation, do not intend to waive, and expressly

reserve, the right to appeal issues raised in the May 22, 2003 ruling issued by Judge Allphin in
connection with UDOT's Motion in Limini and Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment.
9.

Based upon this stipulation and the trial court's May 22, 2003 ruling, no triable

issues remain in this matter.
10.

The parties have agreed this Stipulation is contingent upon the Defendants being

allowed a sign advertising their business on both the north and south off-ramps. The parties
agree that such a sign can be installed.
11.

The parties agree that a Final Order will be issued in this case and will be

recorded. The foregoing will not affect Defendants' right to appeal Judge Allphin's May 22,
2003 ruling.
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DATED this/r day of

/' ^jfUjugyx^

, 2005.

^

MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General

JTEFpffiN g WARD
^A§simaiit Attorney General
Attorneys for Plaintiff

jv
DATED thislD_ day o f f e V ) \ W V , 2005.

i^
DONALDff.WINDER
WINDER' & HASLAM, P.C.
Akqrrneys for James Ivers, Katherine G.
Havas and P&F Food Services
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I hereby certify that on the I b y day of January, 2005, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing document was sent via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, to the following:
Donald J. Winder
John W. Holt
WINDER & HASLAM, P.C.

175 West 200 South, #4000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COUi

APR 0 5 2006

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
--00O00--

James Ivers, Katherine G. Havas,
and P ad F Food Services,
Petitioners,
Case No. 20060061-SC
20050246-CA
Utah Department of Tranportation,
Respondent.

ORDER
This matter is before the court upon a Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, filed on January 20, 2006.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED pursuant to Rule 45 Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, the Petition for Writ of Certiorari is
granted only as to the following issue:
Whether article I, section 22 of the Utah Constitution
permits claims for compensation, and Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-10
permits presentation of evidence of damages, arising from an
alleged easement for view or visibility, where the damages to the
alleged easement are caused by construction beyond the boundaries
of the landowner's property.
A briefing schedule will be established hereafter. Pursuant
to rule 2, the court suspends the provision of rule 26(a) that
permits the parties to stipulate to an extension of time to
submit their briefs on the merits. The parties shall not be
permitted to stipulate to an extension. Additionally, absent
extraordinary circumstances, no extensions will be granted by
motion. The parties shall comply with the briefing schedule upon
its issuance.

For The Court:

Date

A^.^4

Christine M."Durham
Chief Justice
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COCJRT
OF DAVIS COUNTY, STATE.OF UTAH

SECOND
•DISTRICT COMRhUTAH DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,

ORIGINAL

Plaintiff,

Case No. 020700665

vs .
JAMES IVERS,
Defendant,

Trial Testimony of Phillip Cook
Electronically Recorded on
April 15, 2010
BEFORE: THE HONORABLE MICHAEL G. ALLPHIN
Second District Court Judge
APPEARANCES
For the State:

For the Defendant:

Randy S. Hunter
Mark E. Burns
ASSISTANT ATTORNEYS GENERAL
160 East 300 South
Fifth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)366-0953
Donald J. Winder
John W. Holt
WINDER LAW FIRM
175 West 200 South
Suite 4000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)322-2222

Transcribed by: Wendy Haws, CCT
1771 South California Avenue
Provo, Utah 84606
Telephone: (801) 377-2927
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1
2
3

Q.

Why is this data collection process so important to an

MAI appraiser?
A.

You know, appraisers are paid for their opinions, but

their opinions are only as good as the data on which they base
their opinion.

We have a standards obligation,, an ethical

obligation to provide appraisal work in a non —
Q.

Want to pull the microphone back towards

A.

—

—

in a non-misleading way, and to prove our —

our opinions.

prove

Not just to pull something out of the air, but

to 5.ctuaxj.y prove our opinions.

Even tnough there's a lot of.

anecdotal evidence clearly suggesting that view out is not
something these fast food operators particularly care about,
we need to go to the market to confirm that.
Q,

So you didn't rely on this anecdotal evidence in

forming your opinions?
A.

Well, I certainly considered it, but it wasn't my

sole reliance.
.Q.

Okay, so what's the bottom line from your case

studies?
A.

That I cannot is —

I cannot find in the marketplace

where this changed the subject's situation, specificallyrelated to view, disregarding visibility, disregarding
accessibility, disregarding construction nuisance, which
I can't take into account, according to the Supreme Court,
that just this view impairment has no impact on market value.
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A.

I did.

2

Q.

You o b t a i n e d a n e c d o t a l evidence —

3

A.

Yes.

4

Q.

— from market p a r t i c i p a n t s ; and b a s e d upon t h a t

5

effort,

6

A.

t h a t r e s e a r c h , what was your c o n c l u s i o n ?
I c o u l d n ' t i s o l a t e o r p r o v e or i d e n t i f y a n y v a l u e ,

loss

7

o r value d i m i n u t i o n r e l a t e d t o t h i s p a r t i a l view i m p a i r m e n t out

8

to the e a s t ,

MR. HUNTER: Thank you.

9
10

o r t h i s f a s t food r e s t a u r a n t

property.

Your Honor, m i g h t I approach

for a moment?

11

THE COURT: P l e a s e .

12

( D i s c u s s i o n a t t h e bench off t h e r e c o r d )

13

Q.

BY MR. HUNTER: So j u s t t o conclude, i t i s

your

14

p r o f e s s i o n a l o p i n i o n t h a t t h e view out from t h e A r b y ' s

15

r e s t a u r a n t h a s no monetary v a l u e ?

16

A.

Correct.

17

Q.

Thank you.

18

If you can s t a y , because w e ' r e going t o

need t o r e v i e w some of t h e s e , i f t h a t ' s okay?

19

A.

I guess so.

20

Q.

I d o n ' t know how you got t h a t s e t up.

21

thank you.

Thank you.
CROSS EXAMINATION

22
23

All

BY MR. WINDER:

24

Q-

Good morning, Mr. Cook.

25

A.

Good morning, Mr. Winder.
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Q.

I'd like to start' with those things, and there are

quite a few, with which I think we can agree.
with the view.

Let's start

There's no question here, but the view has

been impaired from the Arby's restaurant?
A.

I would say there's a partial view impairment from

the Arby's restaurant.
Q.

So there is a view impairment, yes?

A.

Yes.

Q.

All right.

A.

A partial view impairment.

Q.

You won't give me view impairment, but you'll give me

partial?
A.

Well, I believe that's what it —

what the case is.

In other words, there's no change in most directions, and
there's not a complete blockage of view to the east.

So I

would call it a partial view impairment.
Q.

Now, you're —

you're aware that the view to the

travel lanes of U.S. 89 has been lost?
A.

Yes.

0.

That the view of the East frontage road has been lost?

A.

Yes.

Q.

The view of the Smith's shopping center has been lost?

A.

Yes.

Q.

The lower .foothills of the Wasatch view has been lost?

A.

Yes.
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1

Q

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Is it —
MR. HUNTER:

Your Honor, here's a copy of the — the

slides.
Q

(By Mr. Hunter)

As an appraiser, do you have to

analyze legal issues as you're undertaking an assignment?
A

I do; of course, from an appraiser's perspective,

not an attorney's perspective, but yes.
Q

Okay.

And are these legal issues relevant in an

eminent domain action?
so.

10

A

Very much

11

Q

And can you explain why?

12

A

Well, the rules for appraising in the eminent domain

13

context have come about because of the Constitution and

14'

because of statute that states have enacted t o — t o make sure

15

that property owners are adequately protected.

16

case law so that, for example, this—this case, Arby's case

17

has been before the Supreme Court a couple of times on certain

18

rulings and so those legal rulings form the basis on which an

19

appraisal needs to be completed in this case.

20

Q

Okay.

And also by

And what, as an appraiser, do you understand

21

to be the legal principles to be applied i n — i n your

22

assignment today?

23
24
25

A

As you know, I'm sure by now, Arby's is located next

to the U.S. Highway 89 and Shepherd Lane intersection.
THE COURT:

And—

Mr. Cook, can I interrupt you just a
207
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1

so losing-that traffic by some act of the transportation

2

department is not something that they can c l a i m —

3

Q

4

" A

• Okay.

And--and I don't need you t o —

— a damage for.

5

Q

--to get into the reasoning of the Court here.

6

A

Okay.

7

Q

Just—excuse me--your understanding of your—of the

8

difficulty of your assignment.

9

A

So, the difficulty is, I've got to factor out any

10

value loss that may—may have resulted from the loss of

11

visibility.

12

Q

13

That's—that's the point.

And how about, were there other legal issues that

you had to struggle w i t h —

14

A

Yes.

15

Q

— i n this case?

16

A

Yes.

17

Q

And what were those?

18

A

The other was accessibility.

It used to be that you

19

could turn left right at the intersection, you'd pull up to

20

the light right at the intersection of Shepherd Lane and turn

21

."

left if you were going northbound or turn right if you were

22

going southbound and—and go into the shopping center of which

23

Arby's is a part.

24
25

Q

With t h e —

So, a driver on a sudden impulse could just say, I'm

going to turn here and go in and get an Arby's?
211
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FILED i
AU8 -.9 2010
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURTf

SECOND

DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
-0O0UTAH DEPARTMENT
TRANSPORTATION,

OF

)
)

Plaintiff,

Case No. 020700665
DAY TWO OF TRIAL

vs ,
ZIONS CREDIT

CORPORATION,

JAMES IVERS, KATHERINE G.
HAVAS, P AND F FOOD
SERVICES,
)

Defendants.

)
-0O0-

BE .IT REMEMBERED that on the 14th day of April,
2010, commencing at the hour of 9:02 a.m., the above-entitled
matter came on.for hearing before the HONORABLE MICHAEL
ALLPHIN, sitting as Judge in the. above-named Court for the
purpose of this cause, and that the following proceedings were
had..

.
-oOo-

DEPOMAXMERIT
i LITIGATION S E R V I C E S
333

S O U T H RIO G R A N D E

S A L T L A K E CITY, UTAH

84101

WWW.DEPOMAXMERIT.COM
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1

A

You asked this morning?

2

Q

No.

3

A

Oh.

4

Q

That—yesterday afternoon.

5

A

Oh, yes.

6

Q

That—that's why you're here?

A

Yes, uh huh

Q

A n d — a n d Mr. Free, is it your opinion the 155,000

7

'

8
9

(affirmative).

represents the loss in market value due to the loss of view

10

out at the Arby's?

11

A

No.

The loss of view out is just almost impossible,

12

if you just say the view out, only, that's—that's an

13

impossible concept, it doesn't exist.

I f — h o w do y o u —

14

Q

But if--if y o u — a n d I — I would agree with you.

15

A

Yeah.

16

Q

But if we measure—if we measure the loss of view by

17
18

the following formula, that the loss of view is to be measured
.

by the affect, the obstruction of view the elevated highway

19

has upon the fair market value of the remainder of the

20

property, i f — i f we put that whole package together, then is

21

that your opinion as to the loss of the Arby's?

22

A

Yes.

23

Q

Okay.

Thank you.

24

MR. WINDER:

25

THE COURT:

I have no further questions.
Mr. Hunter?
34
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1

A

Well, I've been asked many times to look at a

2

residential view and—and there is a damaged residential view.

3

I've never been asked—so, this is new territory, I think,

4

we're talking about here in this Court, as far as I know—I've

5

never been asked to--to examine just a view out only of a — a —

6

because people buy homes for a view out.

7

retail for a view out.

They don't buy

So, we're all--

8

Q

Yeah.

9

A

—we're all here and struggling in this courtroom—

10

Q

A fast food restaurant could care less about the

12

A

I wouldn't say care less, but it's—it's almost

13

impossible, it's not in the real world that you can separate

14

it out.

15

didn't want to take the assignment, because I'm saying, well,

16

I can't separate view out very easily; in fact, I've never

17

seen anybody be able to really, absolutely—how do you do

18

that?

19

a--for a business location.

20

the things that go out also are reciprocal.

21

So, I struggle with the scope of this, I almost

Because a view is an interactive thing, normally, for
So, the safety and security, all

So, yeah, I don't—I think this case that you gave

22

me applies to residence, it's difficult to apply to an—an

23

Arby's.

24

Q

Yeah.

25

A

But I—I can see your point, and yeah.
59
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